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1 Introduction
Kristen Rundle has written a very interesting and extensive paper in which she
tries to read together Arendt’s and Fuller’s thoughts on the fascinating relation-
ship between the juridical person as a responsible agent and law’s institutional
framework. My response does not deal with all the aspects addressed by Rundle
in her paper. Instead, my aim is to focus on a few points in the theories of Fuller
and Arendt and to derive my main remarks or points of criticism from them.
These points all revolve around the idea that the experience of legal failure or
legal injustice – rather than the experience of law as such, as Rundle seems to
suggest – is a pivotal junction for both thinkers. This shift in focus needs some
preparation. For that reason, and before responding directly to some of Rundle’s
arguments, I will first explain my own reading of Fuller’s and Arendt’s thoughts
on the experience of legal injustice in sections 2 and 3. Subsequently, in sections
4 and 5, I deal with two points of convergence between Arendt’s and Fuller’s legal
thoughts, while also opening the discussion on some of Rundle’s proposals and
arguments along the way. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Fuller’s external morality of law
In the beginning of The Morality of Law Fuller famously distinguishes between the
morality of duty and the morality of aspiration. Whereas the morality of aspira-
tion deals with the higher aims in life, being excellence and the ‘top of human
achievement,’ the morality of duty:
‘lays down basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible (…). (…)
It speaks in terms of “thou shalt not,” and, less frequently, of “thou shalt.” It
does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportunities for the fullest
realization of their powers. Instead, it condemns them for failing to respect
the basic requirements of social living.’1
In contrast to the morality of duty, the morality of aspiration is very difficult to
grasp in a pluralistic, modern society. According to Fuller, it is far easier to know
what ‘is plainly unjust’ than ‘to declare with finality what perfect justice would be
like.’2 This knowledge of what is plainly unjust is much more a matter of
* The author is grateful to Dr. Marieke Borren for her valuable suggestions.
1 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (revised edition) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969),
5-6.
2 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 12.
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mundane experience than of theoretical reflection or conceptual analysis. Fuller
argues that it is a fallacy to suppose that we can only know what is unjust if we
have clear-cut ideas about justice in the fullest, aspirational sense:
‘This assumption is contradicted by the most elementary human experience. The
moral injunction “thou shalt not kill” implies no picture of the perfect life. It
rests on the prosaic truth that if men kill one another off no conceivable
morality of aspiration can be realised.’3
In short, the morality of duty somehow defines the ‘basic requirements of social
living,’ and the substantial core of these requirements flows from elementary
– and therefore hardly controversial – human experience. Safeguarding these
requirements is the (non-controversial) basic function of the legal order, at least
in modern, secular, pluralistic societies:
‘To live the good life (…) requires the support of firm baselines for human
interaction, something that – in modern society at least – only a sound legal
system can provide.’4
Rather than being repressive, law’s basic function is empowering since it creates
the necessary conditions which enable people to flourish – according to their own
wishes as responsible agents – in their interactions with one another. Fuller’s
elaborate exposé on the ‘internal morality of law,’ with its eight, well-known,
principles of legality (the idea that laws should be general, public, prospective,
comprehensible, not demanding the impossible, non-contradictory, relatively
stable over time and observed by the administration), should be understood in
the context of this basic function (or ‘external morality’) of a modern legal sys-
tem.5 Fuller’s statement that a total failure to comply with one or more of these
eight requirements would result in ‘something that is not properly called a legal
system at all’6 must be understood in the light of law’s basic function.7 A legal sys-
tem that ignores, contradicts or even aims to destroy the possibility of responsi-
ble human interaction as one of the basic requirements of social living no longer
deserves the name ‘legal system’ because its basic function – providing a sound
and stable framework for human interaction8 – can no longer be fulfilled.
It is within this same context that Fuller’s notion of ‘the view of man implicit in
legal morality’ has to be appreciated. This is also a key fragment in Rundle’s
3 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 222 [emphasis: WV].
4 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 205.
5 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 33-94.
6 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 39.
7 See also Pauline Westerman, ‘Means and Ends,’ in Rediscovering Fuller. Essays on Implicit Law and
Institutional Design, ed. Willem J. Witteveen en Wibren van der Burg (Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press, 1999), 145-68, at 147: ‘Only in the domain of “law”, defined by Fuller as a
framework for the horizontal relations between free citizens, and as such distinguished from
managerial direction, these requirements gain moral significance.’
8 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 210.
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paper; for the purposes of this response, however, it is useful to quote it again in
its entirety. Discussing the ‘substantive aims of law,’ Fuller states in The Morality
of Law:
‘To embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance
of rules involves of necessity a commitment to the view of man as a responsi-
ble agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and answerable for
his defaults. Every departure from the principles of the law’s inner morality is
an affront to man’s dignity as a responsible agent. To judge his actions by
unpublished or retrospective laws, or to order him to do an act that is
impossible, is to convey to him your indifference to his powers of self-
determination. Conversely, when the view is accepted that man is incapable
of responsible action, legal morality loses its reason for being. To judge his
actions by unpublished or retrospective rules is no longer an affront, for there
is nothing left to affront – indeed, even the verb “to judge” becomes incongru-
ous in this context; we no longer judge a man, we act upon him.’9
There is an interesting circularity in this line of reasoning. Legal rules presuppose
responsible agents, ‘capable of understanding and following rules,’ on the one
hand, whereas the legal system, on the other hand, maintains and safeguards the
institutional mediation which makes responsible agency possible. Fuller seems to
suggest that in modern societies legal rules and responsible agents are caught in a
symbiosis. Protecting the basic requirements of social living implies law’s consti-
tution of a mediated space in which interactions between responsible agents
become possible: providing a sound and stable legal framework is such an under-
taking. However, if legal rules do not properly address themselves to responsible
agents, they rapidly risk losing their meaning and, subsequently, their ‘legality’; in
other words, their status of legal rules. Moreover, if responsible agents are not
taken seriously by the legal system and its rules, they tend to ‘fade’: ‘there is
nothing left to affront,’ when human beings are no longer approached by law as
responsible agents but merely ‘acted upon.’ In a similar vein, Rundle remarks at
the start of her paper on Fuller’s theory of the morality of law that ‘[l]aw speaks
to agency, and so must also respect and sustain the capacities of the legal subject
as a centre of initiative.’10
3 Arendt’s legal perplexities
Is this same symbiotic relationship between law and responsible agency also pres-
ent in Arendt’s comments on legal injustice as expressed in The Origins of Totali-
tarianism? In the much quoted second part of Arendt’s chapter on ‘The Decline of
the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Men,’ called ‘The Perplexities of the
Rights of Man,’ she describes ‘the deprivation of a place in the world which makes
9 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 162-3 [emphasis: WV].
10 Kristen Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons: Developing Public Legal Theory through
Fuller and Arendt,’ elsewhere in this volume, 222 [emphasis: WV].
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opinions significant and actions effective’ as ‘the fundamental deprivation of
human rights.’11 Arendt speaks of ‘the existence of a right to have rights,’ which
she describes as ‘the right to belong to some kind of organized community,’
conceptualized as ‘a framework where one is judged by one’s actions and opin-
ions.’12 Arendt’s appeal to an ‘organized community’ or a ‘framework’ which
makes one’s actions and opinions meaningful and effective is clearly quite close to
Fuller’s description of the basic function of the legal order: providing a sound and
stable framework for human interaction.
Not surprisingly in the context of a book on the origins of totalitarianism, Arendt
describes at some length the consequences of this deprivation of a legal-political
framework. This deprivation entails a loss of ‘the most essential characteristics of
human life’: ‘the loss of the relevance of speech’ and ‘the loss of all human rela-
tionship’:13
‘The survivors of the extermination camps, the inmates of concentration and
internment camps and even the comparatively happy stateless people could
see (…) that the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their
greatest danger.’14
In short, the idea that the deprivation of an institutional framework that makes
responsible action possible results in a breakdown of the human being as a
responsible agent is something to which both Arendt and Fuller would definitely
subscribe.
But what about the other side of Fuller’s view on the relationship between law
and the human being as a responsible agent? Does Arendt also subscribe to
Fuller’s thesis that legal rules themselves tend to lose their meaning whenever
they (intentionally or accidentally) ignore or contradict the presumption of
responsible agency of their addressees by, for example, depriving certain catego-
ries of people of their existing place in the legal order or simply by excluding them
(i.e., by refusing to ‘welcome’ them and let them ‘in’)?15 There is a good reason to
doubt this. According to Arendt, the production of ‘naked’ human beings is not a
characteristic only of totalitarian systems, but instead an alarming side effect of
‘a global, universally interrelated civilization.’16 Therefore, the exclusion of
11 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace,
1975), 296.
12 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 296-7.
13 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 297.
14 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 300.
15 According to Nanda Oudejans, ‘The Right to Have Rights as the Right to Asylum,’ Netherlands
Journal of Legal Philosophy 43(1) (2014): 16, Arendt’s right to have rights appears ‘first and fore-
most (…) at the boundaries of a polity that separate an inside from an outside and that are never
wholly in the (legitimate) power of a people.’
16 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 302. The (perplexing) production of ‘naked life’ as a hall-
mark of modern politics is the provocative point of departure of Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer.
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Chicago/London: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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specific categories of people from participation in a legal order is, in Arendt’s
thought, not incompatible with a (globalized and interrelated) legal order, but on
the contrary an integral and dangerous part of it.17 It is my impression that
Rundle, in her own description of Arendt’s position in her paper, tends to ignore
this important aspect of Arendt’s thought.
Nevertheless, a certain perplexity seems inevitable when one is confronted by a
legal process directed at the killing of ‘the juridical person in man’ and which
Arendt describes as ‘[t]he first step on the road to total domination.’18 This phe-
nomenon became most shockingly manifest in the way in which European Jews
were systematically deprived of their rights by the Nazis during the Second World
War. In some occupied countries, the Nazis used legal measures to strip Jewish
citizens of their assets and their rights as a means of severely hindering them in
their ability to participate in public, legal and economic life. The perplexity
revolves around the fact that, as Fuller was well aware, legal rules address them-
selves necessarily to addressees who are presupposed to understand and follow
rules, and to be capable of responsible action. A set of laws specifically designed to
deprive its addressees of these capabilities simultaneously confirms and negates
their position as responsible agents. With reference to Jürgen Habermas, it could
be argued that this perplexing ambiguity amounts to a performative contradic-
tion: the content of the legal rule contradicts the presuppositions of asserting it.
This performative contradiction deepens as the annihilation process moves on,
while the legal presupposition of responsible agency becomes increasingly redun-
dant. At a certain point, there is nothing left to address. Then, according to Fuller’s
logic, ‘legal morality loses its reason for being’: it is no longer possible ‘to judge a
man,’ but only ‘to act upon him.’19 This is also why Arendt could write that the
killing of ‘the juridical person’ was merely an essential first step in a larger process
of human annihilation; what follows can no longer be effectuated by general or
public legislative means.20
17 In a similar vein, see Hans Lindahl, ‘A-Legality. Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boun-
daries,’ The Modern Law Review 73(1) (2010): 54-56. According to Lindahl, finite legal orders
always set boundaries which can never be all-inclusive. Every inclusion necessarily produces
(another) exclusion; boundaries always ‘exclude by including,’ as Lindahl puts it. The mere facts
of legal finality and political pluralism (‘the acknowledgement that the human can be irreducibly
alien’) are incompatible with an ‘all-encompassing legal unity.’ Consequently, the idea of ‘one
humanity under one law’ is not of this world.
18 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 447.
19 See supra; Fuller, The Morality of Law, 162-3.
20 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 447. See also Uwe Wesel, Geschichte des Rechts. Von den
Frühformen bis zum Vertrag von Maastricht (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1997), 481-2: ‘Ziel der National-
sozialisten war ein monolithische “arische” Volksgemeinschaft unter Ausschluβ aller, die ihren
autoritären Ordnungsvorstellungen und ihrem Rassenwahn im Wege standen. (…) Die
Geschichte ihrer Ausgrenzung ist geprägt durch zunehmende Entrechtlichung. Das heiβt, das
Recht spielte dabei immer weniger eine Rolle. Zunächst wurde die Ausgrenzung noch juristisch
betrieben durch Gesetze und Gerichtsentscheidungen (…). Aber das führte immer weiter in einen
rechtsfreien Raum, der dann ausgefüllt wurde durch einfache Befehle der politischen Führung
oder völlig freies Handeln von Behörden und Polizei, SS und Gestapo’ [emphasis: WV].
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I am not completely sure whether Rundle, who addresses this same aspect in her
paper and in her earlier article on ‘The Impossibility of an Exterminatory
Legality,’ would agree with me on this point.21 When discussing Arendt’s views on
the juridical person and its dependency on a particular mode of institutional
response, Rundle argues in her current paper that there is an idea of mutual
constitution at play.22 This seems very much in line with my reference to a ‘sym-
biotic’ circularity in Fuller’s thinking and also – albeit to a much lesser degree – in
Arendt’s reflections on ‘the juridical person’ in The Origins of Totalitarianism.
However, Rundle appears to be convinced that, in Arendt’s thought, ‘[t]he realm
of the juridical is defined by the presence of an institutional structure within
which recognition of the person as an individual centre of initiative is sustained.’23
I do not understand how a tendency to sustain – rather than crush – recognition
of the juridical person could a priori be a dominant characteristic of (non-utopian)
institutional arrangements – as if those institutions neither could nor would be
redesigned and used to crush much more than they would sustain. Indeed, in the
light of Arendt’s gruesome remarks on the state of our post-war, non-totalitarian
civilization, ‘forcing millions of people into conditions which, despite all appear-
ances, are the conditions of savages,’ I would suggest quite the contrary.24 Not-
withstanding the paradox of the performative contradiction inherent in legal
measures that purport to destroy the legal agency of human beings, as described
above, it is clear that Arendt is pessimistic about law’s inherent resistance to
being used as a tool to crush the juridical person in certain categories of people, at
least up to a certain point.
There is another way of making this point. In the course of her discussion of
Arendt’s legal thought, Rundle argues that there exists ‘an apparent tension
within Arendt’s analysis between an essentially “anything goes” [read: purely
instrumental, WV] conception of “legality,” and an idea of the “juridical” that
appears to make strong normative demands on a site of political authority and
the corresponding actions of legal officials when such authority expresses itself
through a particular kind of institutional frame.’25 The problem with this distinc-
tion is that it suggests a dichotomy between, on the one hand, a kind of debased,
21 Kristen Rundle, ‘The Impossibility of an Exterminatory Legality,’ University of Toronto Law Jour-
nal 59(1) (2009): 119: ‘[T]he Jewish experience of Nazism brings into sharp relief the fact that so
long as the Nazis used law as their primary means of persecution, and thus were bound by the
condition of congruence that is the defining feature of legality, they necessarily recognized,
relied on, and respected the moral capacities of those whom their racial-biological program sought
to dehumanize’ [emphasis: WV]. This description amounts, in my eyes, to a performative contra-
diction, although I strongly object to the idea that the Nazis themselves respected the moral
capacities of those they sought to dehumanize. A person cannot respect someone and simultane-
ously dehumanize that person. What is possible, though, is that the dehumanizing content of a
legal rule contradicts its presuppositions – the fact that the rule as a rule ‘works’ only if the
addressees are presupposed to be responsible agents, whereas the content of the rule is trying to
take that capacity away from them.
22 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ elsewhere in this volume, 231.
23 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ 229 [emphasis: WV].
24 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 302.
25 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ elsewhere in this volume, 229.
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purely instrumental condition of legality – a condition to be associated with
totalitarian systems – and, on the other hand, a healthy, normative condition of
legality, in which human beings can flourish as juridical persons – a condition to
be associated with the rule of law (and akin to Fuller’s analysis of law’s internal
morality). However, in Arendt’s view, the position to be occupied by the ‘juridical
person’ is never quite stable, neither in a totalitarian state, nor within its interac-
tions with civilized, mundane legal systems. Therefore, according to Arendt, the
instrumental ‘anything goes’-conception of legality has to be understood as a per-
manently recurring, pervasive characteristic of modern legal systems, including
the most ‘civilized’ ones, whereas Arendt’s ‘juridical person’ has no secure condi-
tion or ‘natural’ place of residence. In short, within Arendt’s thinking, ‘the juridi-
cal’ as a healthy, stable condition of legality offering a sustained recognition of
human beings as centres of initiative, appears to operate as a ‘non-place’
(‘u-topia’), never really to be fulfilled within actual legal systems – being produc-
ers of ‘naked life’ and statelessness – but rather functioning, in Arendt’s thinking,
as an external, critical-normative yardstick with a (productive) utopian value.
4 Commonalities
Given the argument developed so far, what can Fuller and Arendt be said to have
in common? Firstly – and on this point I fully agree with a main point in Rundle’s
paper – both thinkers believe that in modern societies the legal subject as respon-
sible agent cannot be thought of outside a legal-political framework constituting a
mediated space in which actions become relevant and effective, or – as Rundle
puts it – conditions of legal subjectivity or juridical personhood ‘exist only in so
far as they are institutionally constituted.’26 This idea, of course, is not new, but
belongs to a venerable tradition within legal philosophy and dates back to
Aristotle, who, as Arendt politely reminds us in The Origins of Totalitarianism,
defined the human being as ‘commanding the power of speech and thought’ and
in particular as a ‘political animal.’27 Working in this same tradition Paul Ricoeur
elegantly captured this same idea in his essay on ‘Who is the Subject of Rights?’:
‘Without institutional mediation, individuals are only the initial drafts of
human persons. Their belonging to a political body is necessary to their flour-
ishing as human beings, and in this sense, this mediation cannot be revoked.
On the contrary, the citizens who issue from this institutional mediation can
26 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ 231.
27 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 297. See also Fuller, The Morality of Law, 13: ‘If we were cut
off from our social inheritance of language, thought, and art, none of us could aspire to anything
much above a purely animal existence.’ On Arendt’s view on the Aristotelian notion of ‘the politi-
cal animal,’ see Jan Klabbers, ‘Possible Islands of Predictability: The Legal Thought of Hannah
Arendt,’ Leiden Journal of International Law 20 (2007): 1-23, at 5.
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only wish that every being should, like them, enjoy such political media-
tion.’28
It is interesting that the second phrase in this quotation is akin to Arendt’s
notion of ‘a right to have rights,’ a ‘right’ to take part in ‘a framework where one
is judged by one’s actions and opinions.’ After all, what Arendt tries to capture
with her notion of a ‘right to have rights’ shows similarities with what Ricoeur
carefully coins as a wish that citizens already enjoying such institutional media-
tion should have with regard to everyone else not yet enjoying such mediation. In
other words, such a wish is an aspiration with a flavour of Kantian duty to it.
Ricoeur’s formulation can be used to clarify Arendt’s ‘right to have rights’ as
something that cannot be called a ‘right’ in the legal sense. This is because the
(lawless and excluded) claimant is completely dependent on the benevolence of
those who already enjoy institutional mediation and who, from within the com-
munity, can potentially decide on the inclusion of those who are excluded.29
Fuller discusses the same point in a slightly different way in The Morality of Law.
Instead of Arendt’s ‘place in the world,’ Fuller speaks of a ‘moral community,’
which he defines as a ‘community within which men owe duties to one another
and can meaningfully share their aspirations,’ but which also gives ‘access to the
essentials on which a satisfactory and dignified life can be built.’30 Fuller main-
tains that the question of inclusion or membership of the moral community is a
decision of the community itself, and that the nature of this decision is first of all
aspirational; in other words, based on a form of generosity of the ‘in-group,’
which cannot be exacted from outside.31 However, the question of including
other human beings within the ‘moral community’ may occasionally transform
into a moral duty. In what seems to be a covert reference to the case of slavery,
and its abolition, in the United States, Fuller suggests that the distinction
between the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty may in specific cases
‘break down’:
‘The morality of aspiration is after all a morality of human aspiration. It can-
not refuse the human quality to human beings without repudiating itself.’32
This remarkably categorical ‘cannot refuse’ within the morality of aspiration is,
again, very similar to Ricoeur’s ‘wish’ that citizens ‘should’ have as quoted above.
It does not, however, alter anything about the fact that those at the border and
claiming their ‘rights to have rights’ are left empty-handed from a legal perspec-
tive.
28 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Who is the Subject of Rights?,’ in The Just, Paul Ricoeur (Chicago/London: The
University of Chicago Press, 2000), 10.
29 In a similar vein, see Oudejans, ‘The Right to Have Rights,’ 14.
30 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 181.
31 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 183.
32 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 183.
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Secondly, both Fuller and Arendt share a vivid interest in the human experience
of (legal) injustice. Fuller’s legal theory, as developed in The Morality of Law, is
premised on the assumption that from our experience of what is plainly unjust it
is possible to derive the basic requirements of social living in a non-controversial
way. Law’s basic function is to safeguard these core requirements by providing a
sound and stable framework for human interactions, thus making responsible
agency possible. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt’s notion of ‘a right to
have rights’ is directly based on the experience of (legal) injustice, more
specifically on the historical experience of the partly legal process by which spe-
cific categories of people have been systematically deprived of the protection of
their participation in a legal-political framework.
What interests me, in responding to Rundle’s paper, is the fact that the notion of
‘experience’ is indeed vital for both Fuller’s and Arendt’s legal thought. However,
my own reading of Arendt and Fuller is that this notion of experience is fruitful in
a slightly different way from how Rundle seems to understand it. According to
Rundle, what is needed ‘is not just an orientation towards the legal subject. It also
requires a wider methodological attitude that regards how a person actually expe-
riences the legal frame around her as central to the value of the theoretical per-
spective ultimately offered.’33 In short, in Rundle’s argument, the focus is on how
a subject experiences law, meaning that the ‘experience’ of the legal subject serves
as a litmus test for the extent to which law’s institutional frame is embodying an
idea of the ‘legal’ or the ‘juridical.’ Here, my more critical point is that this kind of
experience becomes ‘central’ or acute in only the most dire circumstances; in
other words, when the legal subject or juridical person is directly threatened in its
capacities or in its survival as a legal subject, or when it is already in the process of
institutionally ‘fading away.’
I will briefly elaborate on this point in the remainder of this paper. The upshot of
this line of criticism is that if we try to concentrate on the point where Fuller’s
and Arendt’s thoughts on legality and the legal subject appear to converge, we can
see that they certainly have valuable things to say on the connection between the
boundaries of legality and the experience of legal injustice, but a lot less on the
state of law’s institutional framework in less radical circumstances.
5 Fuller’s debasement thesis and Arendt’s rhetorical use of the ordinary
criminal
In his discussion of the inner morality of law Fuller introduces King Rex, whose
subsequent failures to make laws illustrate the (morally relevant) boundaries of
law making. Nevertheless, Fuller realizes that the demands of the inner morality
of law are most of all ‘affirmative in nature,’ meaning that if we approach them as
positive guidelines or regulative ideas, making them really work demands much
creativity and energy. In this aspirational context a checklist of do’s and don’ts (as
33 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ elsewhere in this volume, 234.
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in the morality of duty) is not particularly helpful. Given the craftsmanship-like
nature he ascribes to his inner morality of law, Fuller even concludes at some
point ‘that the inner morality of law is condemned to remain largely a morality of
aspiration and not of duty. Its primary appeal must be to a sense of trusteeship
and the pride of the craftsman.’34
Fuller’s use, at this point, of the word ‘condemned’ may indicate that, at least as a
legal philosopher, he is not perfectly happy with this preliminary ‘conclusion.’
Why not? Perhaps because he feels that his moral approach to legality ultimately
has more pertinent things to say on clear cases of ‘plain’ legal failure than on the
equally or even more important, but potentially countless ways of seeking to
achieve legal perfection. Fuller’s remark, quoted above, that it is far easier to
know (by experience) what ‘is plainly unjust’ than ‘to declare with finality what
perfect justice would be like’ is of course very relevant here.35
Indeed, Fuller’s descriptions of the failures of King Rex to make laws – trying to
regulate behaviour with a retroactive law, proclaiming a law that is utterly incom-
prehensible or otherwise prescribing an action that is impossible to perform and
so on – are more convincing and lasting examples of debasement of legal forms
than his much more hesitant discussion of ‘trends in the law that serve to obscure
the citizen’s role as a self-determining agent,’ as exemplified inter alia by his mis-
givings about the subtle perversions of tax law, nudging (corpulent) taxpayers
into courses of action (i.e., adjusting their diets) that they themselves would not
have taken in less adverse circumstances.36 By this, I do not mean to suggest that
Fuller’s sharp awareness of the fragile legal status of the ‘citizen as a self-
determining agent’ is not important – on the contrary. However, I believe that his
normative stance on current forms of legal debasement is much more poignant
and accurate when he focuses on rare instances of total legal failure than when
he, quite randomly, speculates on the moral limits of legal figures in the immense
grey zone of the always imperfect and debatable world of human law making.
In a different way, Arendt’s ideas on the juridical person in The Origins of Totali-
tarianism cannot be isolated from her narrow focus on law’s perplexing capacity
to deny this status to human beings inside or outside its borders. Arendt’s com-
parison between the stateless person – defined as someone who is excluded from
a legal framework and therefore deprived of all rights, including the possibility to
display responsible agency – and the ordinary criminal – defined as someone who
is still taken seriously by a legal system – is designed to sharpen the reader’s
awareness of the lawless position of the stateless person, and not the other way
round.37 Although I agree with much of what Rundle has to say in this context,38 I
would like to emphasize that Arendt’s description of the criminal serves primarily
34 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 43 [emphasis: WV]. On this point, see also Westerman, ‘Means and
Ends,’ 165-6.
35 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 12.
36 Fuller, The Morality of Law, 166-7.
37 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 286-7; 447-9.
38 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ elsewhere in this volume, 226-228.
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as a rhetorical device and an ironical mirror image, not in order to shift the
attention away from the perplexity of legal exclusion and in the direction of the
vicissitudes of a more or less ‘healthy’ legal system, but on the contrary to high-
light the deplorable state of utter lawlessness in the context of which even the
awkward position of the captured criminal – who is accountable for his actions
and ‘knows’ the reason for his custody – becomes an alluring prospect. That’s also
why I cannot follow Rundle where she states, at the end of her paper:
‘When Fuller explores what it means to be a legal subject, he proceeds “nega-
tively” by emphasizing what happens in the degeneration and ultimate
absence of law’s frame. Arendt, by contrast, proceeds from the more “positive”
perspective of what is generated, in terms of the status of personhood,
through the transformative effects of the juridical frame: that is, she empha-
sizes less what is lost through the loss of the juridical, than what is gained
through it, even if the wider context of her analysis concerns precisely the
fundamental deleterious effects of the loss of rights.’39
The assertion that Arendt would proceed ‘from the more “positive” perspective of
what is generated, in terms of the status of personhood, through the transforma-
tive effects of the juridical frame’ is curious and unfounded; on the contrary, I
would suggest that it is exactly the deliberate absence of such a positive perspec-
tive that is characteristic of Arendt’s contribution to legal philosophy, including
Fuller’s.
6 Conclusion
In evaluating Rundle’s account of the point where Arendt’s and Fuller’s legal theo-
ries converge, my main point is that when taken together, Arendt and Fuller seem
to share a vivid interest in the experience of legal injustice, but as a ‘couple’ do
not have much to say on the more ordinary challenges of law’s institutional
framework. In Fuller’s case, his interest in legal injustice comes to the fore in his
forceful description of moments of partial or total failure in the process of law
making, and also those occasions where the fact that the legal framework no lon-
ger supports human action results in human beings being deprived of their
capacities to demonstrate responsible interaction. Arendt is equally interested in
those terrifying moments where legal institutions no longer offer a framework
for people’s actions and opinions, but instead start to produce inhumanity and
lawlessness. In Arendt’s thought, the exclusion of specific categories of people
from the humanizing framework offered by legal institutions is not incompatible
with a (globalized and interrelated) legal order; instead, and on the contrary, this
production of lawlessness and naked life appears to be an integral and dangerous
part of it. In my opinion, Rundle’s exposé touches on all these points in some
ways, but nevertheless makes both too much and too little of them.
39 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ 237.
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Too much in that I cannot yet see how the ‘experience’ of the legal subject may
serve as a central measure for the extent to which law’s institutional frame is sus-
taining them by fostering a certain idea of the ‘legal’ or the ‘juridical.’40 To my
mind, this kind of experience becomes ‘central’ or vital only when the juridical
persons themselves are directly threatened in their capacities or in their survival
as legal subjects, or when they are already in the process of institutionally ‘fading
away.’
Too little in that, in Rundle’s account, the theme of the exclusionary effects of
legal boundaries, depriving human beings of the possibility of conducting their
lives within a legal framework which makes responsible interaction possible, is
still underdeveloped. The modes of excluding people who dwell at the legal fringes
(in-between an inside and an outside) of civilized political-legal communities and
who repeatedly try to connect to a legal frame are unavoidably an inherent part of
modern legal systems. However, these common modes of legal exclusion cannot
be neutralized simply by pointing to forms of legal ‘debasement’ or to other
explicit or implicit ‘failures’ of the morality of law.
40 Rundle, ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons,’ 222, 228-229, 234.
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